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D

o voters effectively hold elected officials accountable for policy decisions? Using data on natural
disasters, government spending, and election returns, we show that voters reward the incumbent
presidential party for delivering disaster relief spending, but not for investing in disaster preparedness spending. These inconsistencies distort the incentives of public officials, leading the government
to underinvest in disaster preparedness, thereby causing substantial public welfare losses. We estimate that
$1 spent on preparedness is worth about $15 in terms of the future damage it mitigates. By estimating both
the determinants of policy decisions and the consequences of those policies, we provide more complete
evidence about citizen competence and government accountability.

o voters effectively hold elected officials accountable for policy decisions? Studies of political behavior are divided on their views of
voter competence, not only in the domain of vote
choice but also in the domain of attitude formation. On
the one hand, The Michigan School conceived of the
public as myopic, uninformed (Campbell et al. 1960),
and lacking an organized belief system of political attitudes (Converse 1964). Subsequent research showed
that voters lack political knowledge (Delli Carpini and
Keeter 1996), possess misinformation (Kuklinski et al.
2000), and often make seemingly irrational electoral
decisions (Bartels 2008; Caplan 2007; Lau and Redlawsk 2006). Although not always explicitly demonstrated, these studies suggest that voter incompetence
is normatively undesirable because it reduces social
welfare.
On the other hand, Key (1966) argued that the electorate is “responsible,” in that citizens often vote to
reward or punish the incumbent administration for
its stewardship of the country (Fiorina 1981; Kramer
1971). Even if voters are not fully informed, they can
rely on information shortcuts such as cues and endorsements to make sensible decisions (Lupia 1994; Lupia
and McCubbins 1998; Popkin 1991; Sniderman et al.
1991). The information market induced by electoral
competition incentivizes politicians to provide voters
with such information (Wittman 1995). Moving from
the individual to the aggregate level, Page and Shapiro
(1992) argued that even if individual voters exhibit unsophisticated and unstructured conceptions of politics,
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collective preferences are well organized and respond
sensibly and swiftly to government action and national
events. These studies generally conclude that citizen
competence is sufficient to the tasks of electoral accountability.
However, there exist important limitations in the evidence brought to bear by both sides in this debate
on democratic competence. For example, studies of
individual-level attitudes typically rely on secondary
indicators of democratic competence, such as scores
on political knowledge tests (e.g., Delli Carpini and
Keeter 1996), correlations among survey responses as
measures of “constraint” (e.g., Converse 1964), and experimental treatment effects of information cues and
heuristics (e.g., Lupia and McCubbins 1998). Moreover, aggregate-level studies showing that voters respond to macroeconomic conditions at election time
(e.g., Kramer 1971) or that mass public opinion is sensitive to changes in events (e.g., Gerber and Green 1998;
Page and Shapiro 1992) generally contend that such
patterns are evidence of rational response.1 However,
as Achen and Bartels (2004b, 2005) argued, this is not
necessarily the case because voters may be reacting in
ways that make little sense. Finally, the arguments of
both the optimists and the pessimists suggest that levels of information (or lack thereof) among the public
have social welfare consequences, but generally do not
demonstrate their existence.
More broadly, the extant literature has not provided
a full test of government accountability, in the sense
that previous studies have not simultaneously examined (1) voters’ responses to government policy, (2)
incumbents’ responses to public opinion, and (3) the
welfare consequences of elite and mass behavior.
1 The study of retrospective voting has mainly focused on economic
conditions (e.g., Fiorina 1981; Kramer 1971; Lewis-Beck 1988). However, because the state of the national economy is the product of
myriad factors, it is generally unclear how to interpret the empirical
findings of economic voting in terms of accountability. For example, Alesina, Londregan, and Rosenthal (1993, 26) argued that “the
analysis of growth gives no evidence that voters should use information about aggregate growth to learn about competence.” Indeed,
the fact that macroeconomic conditions are not temporally isolated,
combined with the abstruse connections between government policy
and the economy, make it difficult to evaluate the actions of both the
public and politicians.
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This study develops a fuller test of citizen competence and political accountability via an examination
of natural disasters—stochastic, exogenous events that
offer a unique opportunity to assess the reciprocal relationship between government actions and voter responses. Disaster preparedness and response is an area
in which we can actually estimate the effectiveness of
specific policy decisions and voter responses to these
policies. Our results show that voters significantly reward disaster relief spending, holding the incumbent
presidential party accountable for actions taken after a
disaster. In contrast, voters show no response at all, on
average, to preparedness spending, even though investing in preparedness produces a large social benefit.2
We estimate that the average $1 spent on disaster preparedness reduces future disaster damage by more than
$7 in a single election cycle, and that the total value of a
dollar of preparedness spending for all future damage
reduction is about $15.
These empirical results address the limitations of
extant scholarship described previously. First, by exploring electoral responses to government policies, we
avoid secondary indicators, enhancing the ecological
validity of our findings. Second, by examining the electoral consequences of specific government actions in
response to stochastic events, we are able to disentangle voters’ responses to events outside incumbents’
control from their responses to incumbents’ efforts
to prevent or ameliorate the damages produced by
those events. Accordingly, we build on studies that have
also examined voter responses to random events (e.g.,
Achen and Bartels 2004a), but have only explored the
direct effects of the events themselves. Third, we assess the social welfare consequences of voter decision
making, allowing us to assess whether the observed
(un)responsiveness is a sign of competence.
Our central finding is that voters offer scant incentive to presidents to pursue cost-effective preparedness
spending, but do encourage them to send in the cavalry
after damage has been done and lives have been lost.
It is difficult to say how exactly preparedness and relief
spending should be optimally balanced, but the evidence strongly suggests that the manner in which voters currently incentivize politicians—with essentially all
weight on the latter—is anything close to optimal. How
voters incentivize politicians helps explain why public
policy has very strongly favored relief over preparedness, providing a partial account for the government’s
failure to take sufficient ex-ante measures to mitigate
damages from events such as Hurricane Katrina and
the 2008 California wildfires.
This article is organized as follows. In the next section, we present an overview of the theoretical issues underlying our analyses. The following section describes the data and discusses our empirical approach.
2 To some extent, a wide range of government activities could be
considered disaster preparedness under a looser definition of the
term. For example, investments in sewage treatment may avert future public health calamities and may thus be considered disaster
preparedness in that sense. Our focus in this article is on the class of
natural events for which we are able to identify the effects of specific
policy choices.
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The final two sections present the results and discuss
their implications for the study of democratic accountability.

BACKGROUND AND CONCEPTUAL
FRAMEWORK
In developing the theoretical basis for our analysis,
we draw on the extant literature on two sets of relationships: (1) the effect of conditions and events on
elections and voting behavior, and (2) the influence of
voters’ attitudes and behavior on policy making. We
extend these literatures by empirically examining each
direction of the relationship between voting behavior
and policy decisions, whereas the existing literature has
generally focused on mass behavior or elite institutions
in isolation.
As described previously, the bulk of the literature
on retrospective voting and electoral accountability has
explored how voters hold governments accountable for
economic conditions (e.g., Fiorina 1981; Gomez and
Wilson 2006; Hibbing and Alford 1981; Kinder and
Kiewiet 1979; Kramer 1971; Lewis-Beck 1988; Rudolph
2003a, 2003b; Stein 1990). Scores of studies have found
evidence that economic conditions affect voting behavior, both in the United States and internationally,
using both individual-level and aggregate data. Voters
tend to reelect incumbents who have been stewards of
healthy economies and tend to vote them out during
times of economic hardship.
Recognizing the limitations of analyzing macroeconomic conditions, some more recent empirical research
has explored retrospective voting in noneconomic domains. Achen and Bartels (2004a) found that voters
punish incumbents in response to droughts, floods, and
other natural disasters. Malhotra and Kuo (2008) explored partisan bias in attributing blame to government officials following Hurricane Katrina. Grose and
Oppenheimer (2007) and Karol and Miguel (2007) observed that military deaths harm incumbents’ reelection prospects. Berry and Howell (2007) found that
citizens vote against incumbent school board members
in response to falling test scores, but only when the
media make education issues salient in voters’ minds.
Another body of research has argued that government policies are strongly driven by politicians’ desires
for reelection. Even if politicians have higher-minded
goals of pursuing sound and beneficial public policies,
reelection is the proximate objective, and elections
serve as a mechanism to select for “single-minded reelection seekers” (Mayhew 1974, 17). Previous scholarship has found evidence for this proposition, even
in seemingly nonideological domains such as disaster
relief and preparedness in which politicians might not
be expected to pander to narrow constituencies. For example, Garrett and Sobel (2003) found that nearly half
of all Federal Emergency Management Administration
(FEMA) disaster relief payments were motivated by
political considerations as opposed to need.3 Besley
3 In a related vein, Cohen and Werker (2008) described how factors
ranging from a government’s preferences to the localized nature
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and Burgess (2002) showed that politicians in India respond more aggressively to crises when there is greater
media presence, arguing that an active media is important for creating electoral accountability. Even the
decision to make a presidential disaster declaration, a
prerequisite for the availability of federal aid in some
cases, may be politically motivated (Sobel and Leeson
2006). Finally, Chen (2008) found evidence suggesting
that FEMA may have strategically delivered grants to
maximize vote share and buy turnout for the incumbent
administration after the Florida hurricane season in
2004. Taken together, the extant literature underscores
the importance of political motivations in determining
how governments respond to disasters.
In this study, we tie together the research agenda on
voters’ reactions to government performance and the
literature on the effect that electoral incentives have on
public policy via an empirical analysis of natural disaster management and voter responses to federal government relief and preparedness initiatives. Although
we focus primarily on voters’ actions rather than the
processes driving their behavior, previous research suggests several mechanisms that could explain why voters reward relief expenditures, but not preparedness
spending.
Collectiveness. First, in our data, relief spending consists mostly of direct payments, whereas preparedness spending consists mainly of public goods, and
voters may prefer receiving private goods to public
ones (Green 1992; Lizzeri and Persico 2001; Sears and
Citrin 1985). There is an extensive literature in political
science that has argued that the United States is characterized by a high amount of universalistic support
for particularistic spending, especially as compared
to other developed countries (e.g., Ferejohn 1974;
Levitt and Snyder 1997; McGillivray 2004; Shepsle and
Weingast 1981; Stein and Bickers 1995), which may
reflect the fact that voters particularly value this kind
of spending. Citizens may prefer these highly targetable
goods because they receive the whole of the particularistic benefit, but only partly share in the tax burden (e.g., Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Shepsle and
Weingast 1981; Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen 1981).
Observability and Media Priming. Second, the
benefits of preparedness spending may be difficult to
observe and not realized immediately, whereas the benefits of relief spending are highly salient and immediate. Because citizens have been found to be disinterested in politics, and to possess little information about
the specifics of public policies (e.g., Delli Carpini and
Keeter 1996; Kuklinski et al. 2000), many may possess
limited awareness of disaster preparedness policies.
In addition, the news media may be a mediating
factor in what citizens observe. Because the media
compete in a market, they are responsive to audience
preferences (Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005). At the
same time, they seek to gain professional prestige by
of most natural disasters can lead to underinvestment in disaster
preparedness.
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reporting on issues of high societal significance. Finally, politicians attempt to influence media coverage
toward stories that bolster their image (Zaller 1999).
These mechanisms may lead journalists to publicize
dramatic relief efforts after newsworthy disasters take
place, while not discussing more pedestrian preparedness efforts. Because the news media have been found
to have the power to set the agenda on the issues that
citizens use to evaluate politicians (e.g., Iyengar and
Kinder 1987; Miller and Krosnick 2000), citizens may
be primed to consider relief spending when evaluating
government performance.
Temporal Attribution. Compared to preparedness
expenditures, relief expenditures may be more easily
attributable to the current administration, making it
easier for the incumbent to claim credit for the spending (Chen 2008; Mayhew 1974). However, citizens may
only appreciate successful preparedness expenditures
after they successfully mitigate a disaster, which may be
years after the incumbent leaves office. Hence, politicians may not be able to claim credit for preparedness
projects.
Counterfactual Calculation. Citizens may weakly respond to preparedness projects because it is impossible
for them to observe an important counterfactual: what
would have been the impact of the disaster in the absence of the preparedness spending? Conversely, the
counterfactual of relief spending is clearer. Individuals
can more easily calculate the utility gains of receiving
transfer payments.
Shortsightedness. Scholars of public choice have often pointed to “the shortsightedness effect,” or the
observation that public policies are often inefficient
because politicians are incentivized to enact policies
with short-term benefits and larger, long-term costs
because of imminent reelection pressures (Gwartney
et al. 2008; Sobel and Leeson 2006). Constituents may
reward incumbents in the current election cycle for
immediately enjoyed relief payments, but not for preparedness spending, because the associated benefits
may occur with a lag. Moreover, citizens may heavily discount the future, meaning that they have preferences for shortsighted policies (Achen and Bartels
2004b).

EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND DATA
Data
We analyze data on voting behavior, disaster damage,
and federal government spending for the 3,141 counties
or county-equivalent units in the United States.4 All
regressions are run at the county level, and include
4 The Census Bureau describes there being 3,141 counties and
county-equivalent units in the United States (see www.census.gov/
Press-Release/www/releases/archives/facts_for_features_special_edi
tions/000795.html), although other authors have cited the number
as 3,155 (Ansolabehere, Gerber, and Snyder 2002). Parishes in
Louisiana and boroughs in Alaska are equivalent to counties
in the other 48 states. In addition to counties, there are some
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both county and year fixed effects. We describe each
of the data sources in detail in the Appendix, and we
briefly introduce those sources here.
For the voting data, we focus on presidential election
results because the executive branch has substantial
control over providing relief and preparedness spending via FEMA and other agencies (Schneider 2008).
To cover the same time frame as is encompassed by
the spending data, we use the 1988 through 2004 election results to construct the dependent variables in the
voting regressions. The 1984 election results are also
included in the analysis because some of the regressions
include the incumbent party’s vote share in the previous election as a control. The election results from 1992
to 2004 come from Congressional Quarterly’s Voting
and Elections collection. The 1984 and 1988 results are
from the Inter-university Consortium for Political and
Social Research (ICPSR).
The spending data come from the Census Bureau’s
Consolidated Federal Funds Report (CFFR). The
CFFR describes all federal expenditures in “the following categories: grants, salaries and wages, procurement contracts, direct payments for individuals, other
direct payments, direct loans, guaranteed or insured
loans, and insurance.”5 Each spending item includes
the county in which the expenditure occurs and a fivedigit code to identify the purpose of the spending. The
first two digits of the spending code identify the agency
(e.g., FEMA) doing the spending. The entire five-digit
code describes the program under which the allocation
was made. The Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance
(CFDA) contains names for each of the spending codes
and more detailed descriptions of the spending programs in most cases. The catalog descriptions make it
possible to identify both disaster relief spending and
disaster preparedness spending.
In Table 1, we describe all programs that we have
classified as relief or preparedness spending for which
there are observations in the data, including the program name and, if it is available, a brief description of
the program that is excerpted from the full description
available from the CFDA. For some spending codes
that appear to be disaster relief or preparedness, no
expenditures actually occurred, and so we do not list
those expenditure categories. As Table 1 shows, many
of these expenditures were made by FEMA, but there
are also expenditures from the Department of Commerce (DOC), Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and six different expenditure categories
under the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA).
The top panel of Table 1 refers to relief spending
items, most of which consists of direct payments made
to individuals, such as payments to farmers to compensate them for crop losses caused by natural disasters.6
county-equivalent units that consist of census areas in Alaska, along
with independent cities that have no county affiliation and are
primarily in Virginia.
5 The Census Bureau description of the data can be found at www.
census.gov/govs/www/cffr.html.
6 The Department of Agriculture (DOA) and Small Business Administration (SBA) administer loan programs in response to disasters
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The relief spending is ex-post in that it deals with
the consequences of a disaster. As the headings suggest, these spending items would not be expected to
have spillover mitigation effects, an expectation that
is confirmed by the empirical results showing that
relief does not affect future damage. Some, but not
all, of the expenditure categories require a presidential disaster declaration. The bottom panel of Table 1
describes the government’s ex-ante expenditures to either prepare for disasters or mitigate their impacts.
These preparedness spending categories include items
to increase flood protection, training of firefighters, and
contingency planning for earthquakes and hurricanes.
Preparedness spending consists of all spending under
the categories described in Table 1 allocated in the
three years preceding an election, and we also separately examine individual spending items that start and
end within those three years.
All spending data is at the county level. This is sensible because the executive branch has significant discretion in specifying narrow geographic boundaries for
disaster-affected areas (Schneider 2008). In the analysis, we focus on the aggregate relief and preparedness
spending that the federal government allocates in a
given unit of time.
Following the September 11 attacks, there was a dramatic increase in preparedness spending devoted to
firefighting under the Assistance to Firefighters Grant
Program. Although the vast majority of these grants
were administered by the Department of Homeland
Security’s Office for State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness, which is responsible for
coordinating preparation for terrorism, many of the
purchases made under the program could also be useful in dealing with natural disasters. Because it is unclear whether these expenditures should be included
in preparedness spending for natural disasters, we conducted our analyses both including and excluding these
expenditures. We present summary statistics that both
include and exclude this spending, but exclude it when
estimating the regression models. The parameter estimates are very similar to those obtained by including
the grants, both in terms of statistical significance and
substantive meaning.7
One concern about our focus on federal preparedness is that states sometimes engage in preparedness spending, and therefore, voters may reward
state officials as opposed to federal officeholders for

that we do not include in the spending measures. The average annual
expenditure under the DOA’s and SBA’s loan programs was $1.81
billion in January 2008 dollars, or about 60% of the amount spent
annually on relief grants to individuals and local governments. We
include only grants to individuals and local governments to construct
our measure of disaster relief.
7 Due to concerns about changes in spending classification for preparedness, we estimated our regressions by sequentially eliminating
election cycles and found that the coefficient for preparedness did not
substantially or significantly change. Eliminating the 1988 through
2004 election cycles in turn produces the following coefficients and
standard errors for the effect of preparedness on incumbent party
vote share: −.135 (.104), −.061 (.100), −.147 (.103), −.189 (.117), and
.007 (.092).
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Disaster Spending and Relief Categories

Catalog of
Federal Domestic
Assistance Code

Name

Description

Relief spending
10.054 (USDA)

Emergency Conservation Program “. . . to rehabilitate farmlands damaged by wind erosion,
floods, hurricanes, or other natural disasters. . .”
10.073 (USDA)
Crop Disaster Program
“. . . to provide disaster assistance to producers who suffered
crop losses in the 2000 crop year because of adverse
weather conditions. . .”
10.077 (USDA)
Livestock Compensation Program “. . . immediate assistance to livestock producers in counties
that have received primary disaster designation due to
drought. . .”
10.082 (USDA)
Tree Assistance Program
“. . . assistance to tree, bush and vine owners who have trees,
bushes or vines lost by a natural disaster. . .”
10.444 (USDA)
Direct Housing: Natural Disaster
“To assist qualified recipients to meet emergency assistance
Loans and Grants
needs resulting from natural disaster. . .”
10.445 (USDA)
Direct Housing: Natural Disaster
“To assist qualified lower income rural families to meet
emergency assistance needs resulting from natural
disaster to buy, build, rehabilitate, or improve dwellings in
rural areas.”
11.477 (DOC)
Fisheries Disaster Relief
“To deal with commercial fishery failures due to fishery
resource disasters. . . . Disaster causes may be (a) natural;
(b) man-made. . .”
83.516 (FEMA)
Disaster Assistance: general
heading, split into more specific
categories in 1997
83.542 (FEMA)
Fire Suppression Assistance
“To provide grants to States, Indian tribal governments and
local governments . . . for the mitigation, management, and
control, of any fire. . .”
83.543 (FEMA)
Individual and Family Grants
83.544 (FEMA)
Public Assistance Grants
“To assist State and local governments in recovering from the
devastating effects of disasters by providing assistance for
debris removal. . .”
93.003 (HHS)
Public Health and Social Services “To provide supplemental funding for public health and social
Emergency Fund
service emergencies.”
Preparedness spending
10.904 (USDA)
Watershed Protection and Flood
“To provide technical and financial assistance in carrying out
Prevention
works of improvement to protect, develop, and utilize the
land and water resources in watersheds.”
12.101 (DOD)
Beach Erosion Control Projects
“To control beach and shore erosion. . .”
12.106 (DOD)
Flood Control Projects
“To reduce flood damages. . .” (Army Corps of Engineers)
15.031 (DOI)
Indian Community Fire Protection “To provide funds to perform fire protection services for Indian
Tribal Governments. . .”
16.006 (DOJ)
Municipal Fire and Emergency
Services Domestic
Preparedness Equipment
Support Program
16.559 (DOJ)
Local Firefighting and Emergency
Services Training
83.009, 83.405
National Fire Academy Training
“To provide travel stipends to students attending [National
(FEMA),
Assistance
Fire] Academy courses.”
97.018 (DHS)
83.203, 83.505,
Emergency Management
“To assist the development, maintenance, and improvement
83.520, 83.521,
Performance Grants
of State and local emergency management capabilities. . .”
83.535 (FEMA)
83.411 (FEMA),
National Fire Academy
“To increase the professional level of the fire service and
97.019 (DHS)
Educational Program
others responsible for fire prevention and control.”
83.506 (FEMA)
Earthquake and Hurricane Loss
Study and Contingency
Planning Grants
83.519 (FEMA)
Hazard Mitigation Assistance
83.536 (FEMA),
Flood Mitigation Assistance
“To assist States and communities in implementing measures
97.029 (DHS)
to reduce or eliminate the long-term risk of flood damage to
building. . .”

391

Myopic Voters and Natural Disaster Policy

TABLE 1.

August 2009

Continued

Catalog of
Federal Domestic
Assistance Code
83.548 (FEMA),
97.039 (DHS)
83.553 (FEMA),
97.043 (DHS)
83.554 (FEMA),
97.044 (DHS)
97.045 (DHS)

Name

Description

Hazard Mitigation Grant

“To provide States and local governments financial assistance
to implement measures that will permanently reduce or eliminate future damages and losses from natural hazards. . .”
State Fire Training Systems Grants “To provide financial assistance to State Fire Training
Systems. . .”
Assistance to Firefighters Grant
“To provide financial assistance directly to fire departments
and nonaffiliated EMS organizations to enhance their
capabilities with respect to fire and fire-related hazards.”
Cooperating Technical Partners
“To increase local involvement in, and ownership of, the
development and maintenance of flood hazard maps. . .”

Note: (1) The agency codes are USDA, U.S. Department of Agriculture; DOC, Department of Commerce;
FEMA, Federal Emergency Management Administration; HHS, Health and Human Services;
DHS, Department of Homeland Security, DOI, Department of the Interior; DOJ, Department of Justice.

preparedness expenditures. Moreover, federal grants
to the states may be directed by subnational governments, meaning that state and local governments
should be held responsible by voters. We are not greatly
concerned by these possibilities for two main reasons.
First, federal disaster preparedness grants are, by and
large, narrowly targeted to particular geographic areas
(Birkland and Waterman 2008). Second, the bulk of
state spending comes in the form of matching grants
for federal expenditures (Carafano and Mayer 2007;
Jordan 2006). In sum, disaster preparedness and management is a coordinated effort in the United States,
both fiscally and logistically. During the time period
examined in this analysis, the federal government has
maintained a significant role in disaster mitigation,
preparedness, relief, and recovery in the wake of the
Stafford Act of 1988. Still, we examined the possibility that state officials are rewarded for federal relief
and preparedness expenditures. Those results (not reported) show that voters do not significantly reward
governors for federal relief or preparedness spending.
To supplement the spending data, we use the comprehensive data on natural disasters contained in the
Spatial Hazard Events and Losses Database for the
United States (SHELDUS), collected by the Hazards
and Vulnerability Research Institute at the University
of South Carolina. The database contains estimates of
the amounts of damage to property and crops caused
by natural disasters. Among the events included in
the data are severe thunderstorms, earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes, fires, and floods. All events that
caused damages of at least $50,000 are included in the
database.
We combine the voting, spending, and disaster damage data in each county for which it is possible to do
so.8 For some disasters, the SHELDUS database does
not break damage down by county. For example, if
8 Because Alaska does not report election results at the county level,
it is excluded from the analysis.
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a disaster affected ten counties and caused a total of
$1 million in damage and two fatalities, the database
will simply express damage as $100,000 and fatalities
as .2 for each of the ten counties. Because damage is
apportioned evenly for the ten counties, this has the
effect of making per-capita damage appear larger for
small counties, as they are allocated the same amount
of damage as larger counties, with the damage being
spread out over fewer people. To deal with this issue,
we have taken the total damage associated with each
individual disaster and apportioned it according to the
population in each affected county. Continuing with the
previous example, if a county has 1% of the combined
population in the ten affected counties, we would assign
1% of the damage (here, $10,000) to that county. Our
results remain essentially the same whether we use
this measure of damage or the measure obtained by
apportioning damage equally to all affected counties.

Empirical Strategy
To estimate a county’s preferences for the incumbent
party at time t, we use the percentage of the presidential
vote for the incumbent party in the county, c, which
we denote by IncumVotect . Results are nearly identical using the incumbent party’s share of the two-party
vote, which is to be expected because we include year
fixed effects that will account for the overall strength
of third-party opposition in a given year.
To measure disaster relief spending, we use the total
relief spending in a state in the three years preceding an
election. Total relief spending is the sum of all spending in the expenditure categories listed under relief
spending in Table 1. To deal with the heavy skew in
the spending measures, we follow other authors (e.g.,
Ansolabehere, Gerber, and Snyder 2002) and convert
the spending measures into logarithms. The spending
measure that we use is the logarithm of per-capita
spending plus one. The one is added so that, when
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we take the logarithm, the relief spending measure is
mapped back to zero for the case of zero spending.
In equation form, where RelSpend is relief spending
in inflation-adjusted January 2008 dollars and Population is the county’s population, we use the following
measure of relief spending:

RelSpend
+1
Relief = ln
Population


(1)

We operationalize preparedness spending and disaster damage similarly, again considering the amounts
in the three years preceding the election. We consider
spending and damage three years before the election
because we are interested in estimating how effective
preparedness spending is in preventing future damage, and we want to consider preparedness spending that takes place beyond just election years. However, because evidence suggests that it is election-year
economic conditions that influence voters’ decisions
(Achen and Bartels 2004b; Fair 1978), it is reasonable
to expect that spending and disaster damage in the
year immediately before the election might particularly affect voting behavior. Due to this possibility,
we also considered specifications that included only
spending and damage in the year preceding the election. Those results (not reported) are similar to those
reported in this article, with the estimated effect of relief spending being nearly the same and the estimated
effect of damage being somewhat, but not significantly,
larger.
To model the voting decision, we start by extending the baseline model that many previous researchers
(e.g., Achen and Bartels 2004b; Markus 1988, 1992;
Nadeau and Lewis-Beck 2001; Partin 1995) have used,
allowing for a voter’s decision to depend specifically
on the actions that the government takes with respect
to disaster relief and preparedness. We aggregate the
individual voting decision to the county level for estimation purposes. We estimate the following equation
for the five presidential elections from 1988 to 2004:
IncumVotect = α + γc + ηt + λCountyConditionsct

ables, and the incumbent party’s previous vote share in
the county.9

RESULTS
Trends in Relief and Preparedness Spending
Natural disasters of some type affect most of the country, and the amount of damage they cause is substantial.
For 95% of the county-election observations in the
data, there is at least one event causing damage of
$50,000 or more during the three years before an election. In some locations and at certain times, disaster
damage is small, and no federal relief spending occurs. Federal relief spending is positive for 45% of the
county-election observations in the data set. Preparedness spending is positive for 35% of the observations
in the data set. From 1985 to 2004, the average annual
damage caused by natural events to property and crops
averaged $16.5 billion per year (in January 2008 prices).
Over the same set of years, the federal government
spent an average of $3.05 billion on disaster relief and
$195 million on disaster preparedness annually.
The disparity between the amount that the government spends on disaster relief and the amount that it
spends on disaster preparedness has grown considerably since 1988. As shown in Table 2, per-capita relief
spending was $5.00 in the three years preceding the
1988 election. By the 2004 election cycle, relief spending had increased to $68.18 per person. If we consider
the amount spent on relief by the federal government
per dollar of disaster damage, this ratio increased more
than five times from .111 for the three years preceding
the 1988 election to .586 for 2004.10 In other words, in
the years preceding the 2004 election the federal government spent $.59 in relief for every dollar in disaster
damage, whereas it only spent $.11 in the years before
the 1988 election.
These patterns are illustrated geographically in Figure 1, which also shows a very different pattern for preparedness spending. In 1988, relief spending exceeded
preparedness spending across the country, but this gap
had widened by 2004, particularly in the Midwest and
Southeast.11 Expenditures on hurricane, flood, and

+ β1 Damagect
+ β2 Relief ct
+ β3 Preparednessct
+ β4 IncumVotec(t−1) + uct

(2)

To account for time-invariant county characteristics,
we include county fixed effects, γc , in each regression.
To control for national-level conditions in a given year,
such as the identity of the incumbent party and the national growth rate in personal income, we include year
fixed effects, ηt . The inclusion of the county and year
fixed effects ensures that our coefficients of interest are
identified by variation in spending at the county level
in a given election cycle. In our basic specifications, we
include the fixed effects, the damage and spending vari-

9 We considered specifications that included the percentage change
in per-capita income, the percentage of nonwhite residents in the
county, the interaction between percent nonwhite and the identity of
the incumbent party, the share high school educated in the county, the
population in a county, and the unemployment rate. Results remain
essentially the same when these additional covariates are included
in the regression.
10 Disaster damage varied considerably over the five election cycles
considered in this article, with the 1996 election cycle witnessing
considerably more damage than the other four. Total damage in
the three years preceding the 1988 election was $10.8 billion, with
damage rising to $28.9 billion for the 1992 election cycle. The damage
amounts for the three years preceding the 1996, 2000, and 2004 elections were $61.8 billion, $46.7 billion, and $32.4 billion, respectively.
11 These patterns are likely not the result of public and private
insurance taking the place of preparedness spending. Kunreuther
(1996), Burby (2001), and Freeman and Kunreuther (2003) found
that market penetration of flood and other types of insurance is low,
and has not been increasing. For instance, the number of households
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TABLE 2.

Vol. 103, No. 3

Damage and Spending over Time
Election Cycle

Relief spending
Per-capita relief spending
Per-capita damage
Relief spending/disaster damage
Preparedness spending (excluding firefighting)
Per-capita preparedness spending
Non–firefighting preparedness/relief spending
Preparedness spending (including firefighting)
Per-capita preparedness spending
Total preparedness spending/relief spending

1988

1992

1996

2000

2004

$5.00
$45.24
.111

$7.20
$113.54
.063

$37.42
$23.98
.162

$34.50
$166.82
.207

$68.18
$116.30
.586

$1.41
.281

$1.00
.138

$1.11
.030

$1.59
.046

$.53
.008

$1.41
.281

$1.02
.142

$1.22
.033

$1.75
.051

$3.55
.052

Note: Election cycle refers to the three fiscal years preceding an election. For example, the measures for the 1988 election cycle
include all spending from October 1, 1985 to September 30, 1988.

earthquake preparedness (excluding firefighting expenses) fell during the sample period. Per-capita preparedness spending was $1.41 in the years preceding
the 1988 election, somewhat lower during the following
two election cycles, and it then increased to $1.59 for
2000 before falling to $.53 for 2004. A shift in priorities
toward responding to terrorism appears to explain the
fall in natural disaster preparedness spending during
the first term of the Bush Administration. If we include
spending under the Assistance to Firefighters grant
program (most of which was related to terrorism) in
our overall preparedness measure for the 2004 election
cycle, we find that per-capita preparedness spending
increased to $3.55 during Bush’s first term. Even this
increase is still much smaller than the rise in disaster relief spending over the same time period. After
spending $.28 in preparedness for every dollar spent on
relief during the 1988 election cycle, the federal government spent only $.05 on preparedness for every dollar
spent on relief in the 2004 election cycle. If firefighting
spending is excluded from preparedness, spending fell
precipitously in the 2004 election cycle to only $.01 on
preparedness for every dollar spent on relief.
Qualitative evidence suggests reasons for these
trends. Walters and Kettl (2005) interviewed disaster
management experts, who noted that the federal role
in disaster response and recovery has greatly expanded
since the 1980s, principally due to a series of major
disasters between 1989 and 1992. Our interviews with
FEMA officials in the Oakland regional office indicated that the increasing focus on relief instead of
preparedness arose in part because criticism of the

in high-risk flood areas covered by flood insurance has remained
between 20% and 27% for 1992 to 1997 (Palm 1997). Moreover, the
government has been reducing its role in disaster-related insurance
via legislation such as the Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2004.
If anything, changes in insurance coverage should offset relief payments with insurance claims, which have been rapidly increasing over
time. Indeed, Kunreuther (2006) found that suboptimal insurance
coverage is often compensated by government-provided relief.

federal government’s handling of events such as the
Loma Prieta earthquake and Hurricane Andrew focused on failures in assisting victims ex-post.12

The Value of Preparedness
Depending on the effectiveness of government preparedness efforts, the shift in priorities from preparedness to relief may be accompanied by significant efficiency losses. Here, we attempt to estimate the effectiveness of previous government projects aimed at
preparing for or mitigating damage from natural disasters. To estimate the effectiveness of government preparedness spending, we regress disaster damage in a
county on preparedness spending during the previous
two election cycles, as well as county and year fixed
effects. We also consider a specification that includes
relief spending and damage during the previous two
election cycles as additional independent variables. The
inclusion of relief spending in the regression makes it
possible to test the hypothesis that relief itself may mitigate future damage. Lagged damage was included because preparedness is higher in places that previously
experienced disasters. Therefore, without a control for
lagged damage, the coefficient for preparedness will
capture both the effect of preparedness spending on
damage and the mean reversion that takes place in
damage.
Preparedness spending has led to significant reductions in disaster damage. In the first column of Table 3,
the coefficient estimate of −.134 indicates that a 1%
increase in preparedness spending during the previous
two election cycles led to a .134% reduction in damage
during the current cycle. This estimate is somewhat
smaller, but is still significant, when we include relief
spending and previous damage as control variables (see
the second column of Table 3). These results also show
12 We interviewed Farley Howell (Federal Preparedness Coordinator, National Preparedness Division, Region IX) and Susan Waller
(NIMS Coordinator, National Preparedness Division, Region IX).
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TABLE 3.

August 2009

Value of Preparedness Spending
Dependent Variable: Disaster Damage Measure
All Preparedness

Preparedness measure for previous
two election cycles
Relief measure for previous
two election cycles
Damage measure for previous
two election cycles
Preparedness spending to improve
effectiveness of response

R2
Number of observations

Flow Preparedness

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

−.134∗∗
(.044)

−.106∗∗
(.041)
−.039
(.038)
−.466∗∗
(.024)

−.105∗
(.042)
−.039
(.038)
−.466∗∗
(.024)
−.030
(.075)

−.146∗∗
(.05)

−.115∗
(.048)
−.040
(.038)
−.466∗∗
(.024)

−.113∗
(.048)
−.040
(.038)
−.466∗∗
(.024)
−.030
(.075)

.500
9,332

.556
9,332

.556
9,332

.500
9,332

.556
9,332

.556
9,332

Notes: (a) Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the county level.
(b) Each regression includes county fixed effects and year fixed effects.
(c) The categories that are identified as preparedness that improves the effectiveness of response are 16.006, 16.559,
83.009, 83.405, 83.203, 83.505, 83.520, 83.521, 83.535, 83.506, 83.553, and 97.043.
(d) ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01 (two-tailed).

that relief spending has no significant effect on future
damage and that, not surprisingly, there is significant
mean reversion in disaster damage, as indicated by the
negative coefficient for lagged damage. The coefficient
for preparedness is −.106, suggesting that a 1% increase in preparedness spending during the previous
two election cycles led to a .106% reduction in damage during the current cycle. We find a similar estimate when we separately control for the preparedness
spending that is intended to increase the effectiveness
of response, such as first responder training (see column three). Our estimates suggest that it is other kinds
of preparedness spending and not relief-related spending that reduces future damage.
Using the estimate of the impact of preparedness
spending on future damage in column (3), we can estimate the value of a dollar of preparedness spending.
The coefficient estimate of −.105 suggests that a $1
increase in preparedness spending resulted in approximately a $7.37 decrease in disaster damage, and this
estimate captures only the reduction in damage that
occurs during a single election cycle.13 We can use
this figure to estimate the net present value (NPV)
of a dollar of preparedness spending in terms of reduced future damage from natural disasters. This estimate of the total benefit of a dollar of preparedness
spending represents all future reductions in damage,
where those benefits are discounted for the fact that
resources invested today in other ways could have
13 Total damage in the 1996, 2000, and 2004 election cycles averaged $47.0 billion per cycle. We estimate the average annual damage
prevented by a 1% increase in preparedness spending during the
previous two election cycles to be .01 ∗ .105 ∗ $47.0 billion = $49.4
million. Total preparedness spending over the previous two election
cycles averaged $670 million, so that a 1% increase in preparedness
is .01 ∗ $670 million = $6.7 million. The estimated effect of a dollar of
preparedness spending is thus ($49.4 million/$6 .7 million) = $7.37.
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yielded their own return and that preparedness investments will depreciate, becoming less effective over
time. Assuming a 4% annual interest rate and a 6%
depreciation rate for preparedness investments, we
estimate the NPV of $1 of disaster preparedness to be
about $15.14
In columns (4) through (6), we consider the effectiveness of preparedness projects that were started and
completed within a single presidential term. We refer
to this sort of spending as flow preparedness. We break
down preparedness spending in this manner because in
later tables we estimate the effect that within-term preparedness spending has on voting behavior. Approximately 45% of total preparedness spending falls into
the flow category. The results in columns (4) through
(6) show that this sort of preparedness spending is
about equally successful in mitigating future damage
as overall preparedness spending.
Although our estimates strongly suggest that preparedness spending reduces a substantial amount of
future damage, it is important to note that the estimated effect represents the average effect of preparedness spending on disaster damage. If the government
pursues only the most urgent preparedness projects,
the marginal effect associated with the government
pursuing the best project that it currently ignores will
be somewhat less than the average effect. Nevertheless, the results clearly demonstrate that preparedness
spending significantly reduces future losses. Consistent with the anecdotal evidence on recent government failures to adequately prepare for disasters, our
14 Nadiri and Prucha (1996) estimated 5.9% to be the annual depreciation rate of physical capital for U.S. manufacturing. A 4%
annual interest rate translates to 17% over a four-year period. A 6%
annual capital depreciation rate translates to 26% over a four-year
period. The net present value of $1 of preparedness is then given by
(1/(1.17)(1.26) − 1)($7.37) = (1/0.48)($7.37) = $15.35.
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TABLE 4.

Vol. 103, No. 3

Determinants of Disaster Spending

A. Dependent Variable: Relief Spending Measure
(1)
(2)
Disaster damage measure

.072∗∗
(.019)

.072∗∗
(.017)
.018∗∗
(.004)

.703
15,565

.714
15,562

Incumbent party’s previous
vote share in the county

R2
Number of observations

B. Dependent Variable: Preparedness Spending Measure
(1)
(2)
Disaster damage measure

.009
(.007)

.009
(.007)
.001
(.001)

.482
15,565

.482
15,562

Incumbent party’s previous
vote share in the county

R2
Number of observations

Notes: (a) Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the state
level.
(b) All regressions include county and year fixed effects.
(c) ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01 (two-tailed).

findings strongly suggest that there are large efficiency
losses associated with underinvestment in disaster preparedness.

The Determinants of Disaster Spending
Before describing the effects that relief and preparedness spending have on voting behavior, we first examine the determinants of spending. We regress our relief
and preparedness spending measures on disaster damage, the incumbent party’s previous vote share in the
county, and county and year fixed effects. The county
fixed effects account for a given county’s average exposure to natural disasters. We include the incumbent
party’s previous vote share to account for the fact that
more government spending on disasters may be directed to areas that provide more electoral support to
the incumbent party (Chen 2008).
Government relief expenditures are significantly affected by disaster damage, as one would expect. As
shown in the first column in the top panel of Table 4,
when disaster damage increases by 1%, the regression results suggest that relief expenditures increase
by .072%, on average. There appears to be a significant political component to disaster relief spending as
well. As shown in the second column, counties that
more strongly supported the incumbent party in the
previous election received more relief spending than
did other counties. The effect of previous vote share on
spending is substantial and highly significant (p < .001).
The coefficient of .018 indicates that a one percentage
point increase in the incumbent’s previous vote share
in the county leads to an average increase of 1.8% in
the amount of relief spending that a county receives.
Hence, incumbents are either more prone to respond
to disasters that occur in supportive counties, or they

∗

year

dress up other transfers in the guise of disaster relief
and then direct those payments to supportive areas.15
In contrast to relief spending, preparedness spending
does not significantly respond to disaster damage (see
bottom panel of Table 4).16 Counties that supported
the incumbent party are not significantly more likely to
receive disaster preparedness spending, and the point
estimate is close to zero. The fact that the effect of political considerations is much smaller for preparedness
spending than for relief spending makes sense in light
of the results that follow, which suggest that voters do
not, in general, value preparedness spending.

Voter Responses to Relief and
Preparedness Spending
A visual inspection of spending and voting patterns reveals inconsistency in political accountability. We first
present the raw data, examining the general shape of
the relationship between disaster-related expenditures
and incumbents’ reelection prospects. In Figure 2, we
15 Chen (2008) found that directing resources to supportive areas was a vote-maximizing strategy for the Bush Administration
following the 2004 hurricane season in Florida because voters were
more sensitive to spending in Republican areas than in Democratic
ones.
16 The insignificant coefficient for damage occurs even though, in the
early years of the data, it was official government policy, under the
Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, for some disaster preparedness
spending to be dedicated to areas that had experienced recent damage. Before 1995, “federal investments in community mitigation were
mainly made in the context of disaster events” (Wachtendorf et al.
2002, 11). In 1995, FEMA changed that policy, “making it possible for
communities that had not experienced disasters to receive funding
to mitigate future losses” (11). This initiative was part of a change
in policy under Director Witt to focus more on ex-ante measures to
mitigate disaster damage.
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TABLE 5.

Vol. 103, No. 3

Voter Responses to Relief and Preparedness Spending

Dependent Variable: Presidential Vote Share for the Incumbent Party in the County
All Preparedness
Flow Preparedness
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

−.048
(.078)
.347∗∗
(.116)
−.11
(.087)

−.049
(.078)
.347∗∗
(.116)
−.001
(.107)

.935∗∗
(.013)

−.055
(.072)
.456∗∗
(.133)
−.142
(.124)
−.033
(.178)
−.018
(.04)
.938∗∗
(.014)

.927
15,561

.933
12,447

Lagged preparedness spending∗
Disaster damage measure
Incumbent party’s previous
vote share in the county

.935∗∗
(.013)

−.062
(.075)
.454∗∗
(.133)
−.136
(.104)
−.052
(.138)
.015
(.03)
.938∗∗
(.014)

R2
Number of observations

.927
15,561

.933
12,447

Disaster damage measure
Relief spending measure
Preparedness spending measure
Lagged preparedness spending

Notes: (a) Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the state ∗ year level.
(b) All regressions include county and year fixed effects.
(c) ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01 (two-tailed).

plot the change in the incumbent party’s county-level
vote share from the previous election to the current
one against the changes in relief and preparedness
spending in the county. We observe a positive relationship between changes in incumbent vote share and
changes in relief spending. The relationship between
changes in the incumbent party vote share and changes
in preparedness spending is, in contrast, nearly flat.17
We confirm these general patterns via nonparametric
regression curves.18
The figures suggest a relationship, and potentially a
strong one, between voter decisions and relief spending, as well as the absence of such a relationship between voting decisions and preparedness spending.
Table 5 presents the results of regressions that subject
these apparent relationships to a variety of controls.
The first column reports the results obtained by including county and year fixed effects in a regression of
incumbent party vote share on disaster damage, relief
spending, preparedness spending, and the incumbent
party’s previous vote share in the county. The second
column expands the regression to include lagged preparedness spending as well as an interaction between
lagged preparedness spending and disaster damage.
Because preparedness spending has been shown to reduce damage, including the interaction between lagged
preparedness and damage allows us to account for the
fact that damage is endogenous to previous prepared17 The observed mean drop of about 4% reflects the regression to
the mean in the incumbent party vote share. Because it won the
previous election, the incumbent party by definition did well then,
and it generally does less well in the current election.
18 To create confidence intervals for the fitted curves, we randomly
selected 30% of the data points for the figures so that the procedure
would converge. The regressions that include all data points produce
nearly the same curves as those shown in the figure based on the
30% subsample.

ness spending. In the third and fourth columns, we
consider analogous regressions that use the flow measure (spending on projects completed within a single
presidential term) as the preparedness variable.
Although we are primarily interested in the
spending coefficients, we first note that damage enters
insignificantly in all specifications, but its negative
sign suggests that disaster damage may have some
negative effect on the incumbent party, consistent
with Achen and Bartels (2004a).19 Consistent with
the figures, the results for spending in the first two
columns indicate that increases in relief spending
significantly predict increases in the incumbent party’s
vote share (p = .003 in column (1), p = .001 in column
(2)), whereas preparedness spending has no significant
effect, and the point estimates are close to zero.
When we consider the flow measure of preparedness,
the coefficient for relief remains highly significant,
and preparedness continues to have no significant
effect. Comparing the coefficients associated with the
spending variables via an F-test, the null hypothesis
that relief and preparedness spending have the same
effect on incumbent vote share can be rejected (p <
.001 in columns (2) and (4)) in all specifications.
In column (2), the size of the coefficient for relief
spending of .454 indicates that, on average, a 1% increase in relief spending—an increase of about .01 in
the log of relief spending—increases the incumbent
party’s vote share by about .0045 percentage points.
The t-statistic for this effect of 3.42 indicates that
the relationship between relief spending and voting
19 If we consider damage and spending in just the year before the
election, the point estimate for damage roughly doubles, suggesting
that the incumbent party may indeed suffer losses due to disaster
damage that occurs close to the election. Detailed results are available on request.
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decisions is strongly significant. The estimated coefficient confirms the visual evidence in Figure 2, indicating that large increases in relief spending lead to
substantial vote gains for the incumbent party. If the incumbent party increases relief expenditures in a county
from $1 per person (the 66th percentile for spending
in the data) to $10 per person (the 93rd percentile in
the data), the regression results suggest that the incumbent party will gain about .77 percentage points in the
county.20 Another way to think about this effect is in
terms of the amount of disaster spending required to
buy an additional vote. The coefficient estimate suggests that about $27,000 in relief spending buys one additional vote.21 This estimate is of a similar magnitude
to the $21,000 that Chen (2008) found it cost President
Bush to purchase a vote in moderate precincts with
disaster relief in response to the Florida hurricanes in
2004.22
We also tested some of the mechanisms described
previously. Detailed results for each of these tests are
available on request. As shown in the third and fourth
columns of Table 5, the coefficient estimate on preparedness spending is small and insignificant regardless
of whether we consider the overall amount or the flow
measure. The fact that voters do not reward preparedness projects even when they are confined to a single
presidential term suggests that the temporal attribution mechanism may not be a primary determinant of
why voters do not respond to preparedness spending
in general.
To investigate the shortsightedness mechanism, we
examined the effect of relief and preparedness spending in just the year before the election and found that
the effect sizes are similar to those obtained using a
three-year horizon. The fact that the results are consistent across different lag structures suggests that the
shortsightedness mechanism likely does not explain
voter responses.
To consider the possibility that only the largest preparedness projects are observed by the voters, we estimated regressions that allowed for nonlinearities in the
relationship between spending and election outcomes.
We found no evidence that voters respond to preparedness above some threshold. Hence, observability as
measured by project size appears not to explain the
flat relationship between incumbent vote share and
preparedness spending. We are, however, unable to as20 This estimate comes from multiplying the coefficient of .454 for
the relief spending measure in Table 5 by the change in the relief
spending measure (ln (10 + 1) – ln (1 + 1)).
21 A 1% increase in relief spending over an election cycle is approximately $122 million (.01 ∗ $3.05 billion/year ∗ 4 years). Given
that approximately 100 million people voted, on average, in the five
election years in the data, a 1% increase in relief spending is estimated to gain about .000045 ∗ (100 million votes) = 4,500 votes for
the incumbent party. Combining these numbers gives an estimate of
$122million/4, 500votes = $27, 100/vote.
22 Our estimate is also of a similar magnitude to the $14,000 in pork
that Levitt and Snyder (1997) found to correspond to one additional
vote for a congressional incumbent. Chen (2008) found that the cost
of a vote depended on the partisanship of the precinct, estimating that
the cost of a vote in Republican precincts was about $7,000, whereas
votes could not be purchased with relief in Democratic precincts.
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sess observability as a function of media attention and
priming because we do not have a measure of media
coverage. Future research could potentially use content
analysis to investigate this aspect of the observability
mechanism in greater detail.
Finally, we considered a variety of control variables
and robustness checks to these basic regression results.
As controls, we included terms for the percentage nonwhite in the county, an interaction between the percent nonwhite and the identity of the incumbent party,
per-capita income in levels, per-capita income growth,
and overall per-capita federal government expenditure. One specification check we considered included
controls for relief and preparedness spending in the
nearest five counties because preparedness spending
could have spillover effects that help reduce damage
in nearby areas.23 We also tested the robustness of our
results by analyzing the data using propensity score
matching, employing Imai and Van Dyk’s (2004) procedure for continuous treatment variables. Across the
different specification checks, the results of interest remain essentially unchanged. The coefficients for relief
and preparedness remain nearly the same in terms of
magnitude and exactly the same in terms of statistical
significance.

Collectiveness as an Explanatory
Mechanism
We next explore in depth a potential mechanism underlying the results: voters reward relief spending but not
preparedness spending because relief spending generally comes in the form of direct, individual-level
payments, whereas preparedness usually comes in the
form of collective goods. Most of the spending codes
are easily identified as representing direct payments
to individuals or some other form of expenditure. For
example, the Crop Disaster Program (10.073) provides
“disaster assistance to producers who suffered crop
losses,” and we code this program as providing direct payments to individuals. In contrast, the Public
Assistance Grants (83.544) “assist state and local governments in recovering from the devastating effects of
disasters by providing assistance for debris removal,”
and we code that program as being a form of collective
relief expenditure.
Some codes either include both expenditures with individual and collective benefits or are ambiguous as to
the kinds of expenditures associated with the program.
An important example in our data is the general heading “Disaster Assistance” (83.516), which was split into
a variety of more specific headings in 1997. For these
programs, we use another data source, the Federal Assistance Awards Data System (FAADS), to estimate
the share of payments in a county in a given election
cycle that was directed to individuals. The Consolidated
Federal Funds Report, on which the preceding tables
23 Per-capita income growth has a significant effect on incumbent
vote share. The other control variables enter insignificantly. Relief
and preparedness spending in neighboring counties have insignificant effects as well.
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TABLE 6.

Vol. 103, No. 3

Voter Responses to Individual and Collective Spending

Dependent Variable: Presidential Vote Share for the Incumbent Party in the County
All Preparedness
Flow Preparedness
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

−.054
(.077)
.519∗∗
(.128)
−.110
(.515)

−.054
(.077)
.519∗∗
(.128)
−.166
(.574)

.932∗∗
(.013)

−.054
(.077)
.520∗∗
(.129)
−.165
(.574)
−.051
(.16)
.010
(.106)
.932∗∗
(.013)

.927
15,561

.927
15,561

Incumbent party’s previous vote share
in the county

.932∗∗
(.013)

−.053
(.077)
.522∗∗
(.129)
−.130
(.514)
−.051
(.16)
−.101
(.087)
.932∗∗
(.013)

R2
Number of observations

.927
15,561

.927
15,561

Disaster damage measure
Direct payment relief spending measure
Direct payment preparedness spending measure
Collective relief spending measure
Collective preparedness spending measure

Notes: (a) Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the state ∗ year level.
(b) All regressions include county and year fixed effects.
(c) The following codes are classified as direct payments to individuals: 10.054, 10.073, 10.077, 10.082, 10.444, and
83.543. The following codes are classified as collective payment programs: 10.904, 12.101, 12.106, 16.006, 16.559,
83.203, 83.505, 83.506, 83.519, 83.520, 83.521, 83.535, 83.536, 83.542, 83.544, and 83.548. The Federal Assistance
Award Data System was used to identify the type of spending for 11.477, 15.031, 83.009, 83.405, 83.411, 83.516, 83.553,
93.003, 97.018, 97.019, 97.029, 97.039, 97.043, 97.044, and 97.045. For one case (La Paz County, Arizona, for the 1988
election cycle), we were not able to assign any spending to either individual or collective aims.
(d) ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01 (two-tailed).

are based, is constructed from a variety of data sources,
one of which is the FAADS. The FAADS contains a
variable that describes the recipient type (e.g., state
government, private business, or individual) for the
expenditures that the federal government makes. For
all election cycles where the FAADS contains data on
the expenditures made in a county for a given program,
we assign the share of payments made to individuals in
the FAADS to be the share of total payments made to
individuals for our spending data. For example, if $10
per capita was spent in a county in the 1992 election
cycle under program 83.516, and we estimate from the
FAADS that 90% of the expenditures in the 1992 election cycle in that county under program 83.516 were
expenditures directed to individuals, then we assign
$9 per capita to be direct payments to individuals.24
The results suggest that voters respond only to relief spending that consists of direct payments to individuals, thereby providing some support for the
collectiveness mechanism. In Table 6, we report the
results obtained by estimating the different effects
that relief and preparedness spending have on vote
share by whether the expenditures are individually
targeted as opposed to being collectively targeted.
24 We assign payments to Indian tribes, individuals, profit organizations, and small businesses to be direct payments. If we change the
definition to exclude different kinds of recipients, we obtain results
that are similar in terms of both statistical significance and coefficient
magnitudes.

The coefficient on collective relief spending is statistically indistinguishable from zero, and the point estimate is small in magnitude. Conversely, the coefficient estimate for individually targeted relief spending
is large and statistically significant across all specifications.
At the same time, voters appear not to reward preparedness spending even when the benefits are particularistic. As shown in Table 6, the point estimates for individual and collective preparedness expenditures are
similar in size, and both are close to and not significantly
different from zero. We caution against making strong
statements here because only .4% of preparedness expenditures were targeted to individuals, leading to a
large standard error on our coefficient for the effect of
individual preparedness spending.
To summarize, we find partial support for the collectiveness mechanism as an important determinant of
voter behavior. Voters only value relief when those
expenditures are individually targeted, but appear not
to value preparedness spending under any circumstances. We found evidence inconsistent with many of
the other theoretical mechanisms described previously.
Voters treat flow preparedness expenditures no differently than total preparedness expenditures, suggesting
that they are not misattributing mitigation measures
from previous administrations. Government spending
undertaken the year before the election has a similar
effect on incumbent vote share as does spending undertaken over the past three years of an administration,
meaning that voters do not appear to be particularly
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shortsighted in the domain of natural disaster spending.
Finally, voters are not responsive to larger (and potentially more observable) preparedness and mitigation
initiatives.

voters incentivize politicians to at least get the ratio of
preparedness to relief wrong.26

The Cost of Imperfect Retrospection

A government responding to the incentives implied
by our results will underinvest in natural disaster preparedness. The inability of voters to effectively hold
government accountable thus appears to contribute to
significant inefficiencies in government spending because the results show that preparedness spending substantially reduces future disaster damage. Voters are,
in a word, myopic. They are not, as we have shown,
myopic in the sense that they respond more to spending
just before an election than to spending a year or two
earlier; rather, they are myopic in the sense that they
are unwilling to spend on natural disasters before the
disasters have occurred. An ounce of prevention would
be far more efficient than a pound of cure, but voters
seem interested only in the cure. The resulting inconsistencies in democratic accountability reduce public
welfare by discouraging reelection-minded politicians
from investing in protection, while encouraging them
to provide assistance after harm has already occurred.
Although we consider our findings to be relevant to
potential underinvestments in preparedness in areas
beyond natural disasters such as preventive medicine,
the government almost certainly does not underinvest
in all kinds of preparedness. For example, after the attacks on September 11, large investments were made in
preventing future attacks on passenger jets. One clear
difference between airport security and most natural
disaster preparedness measures is that airport security
is highly observable and salient. Moreover, this example may be the exception that proves the rule we have
demonstrated in this article. When voters provide their
elected officials with incentives to make mistakes—
ranging from insufficient investment in natural disaster
preparedness to perhaps excessive attention to airline
security—elected officials are likely to provide the inefficient policies that voters implicitly reward.
Moreover, it is possible that major events such as
Hurricane Katrina can heighten the value of natural
disaster preparedness, but this effect may be temporary. For example, California passed Proposition 1E
in 2006, a measure that provided bond financing for
$4.1 billion in flood control measures, with $3 billion
for upgrades to levees in the Central Valley, an area
considered by experts to be exposed to catastrophic
flooding due to insufficient protection from the existing levee network. Experts characterized the situation
as a “ticking time bomb” in January 2005 (California

Consistent across all results is the finding that voters
reward relief spending, but not preparedness spending.
What is the cost associated with this behavior? Here, we
consider a back-of-the-envelope calculation that gives
some idea of the loss in public welfare.
As an example, we consider 2000, the median election cycle in the data for the ratio of relief spending
to preparedness spending. In that cycle, per-capita relief spending was $34.50 and per-capita preparedness
spending was $1.59. Suppose that just $1 per-capita is
added to preparedness, a total increase of about $291
million that would still leave the federal government
spending more than ten times as much on relief as
on preparedness.25 Subtracting the $1 cost of the investment, the approximately $15 reduction in future
damage yields a welfare gain of $14 from the increase in
preparedness. Our estimates therefore suggest that voters would realize a welfare gain of about $4.07 billion
from the $291 million increase in preparedness spending. This calculation assumes that marginal increases
in spending will continue to have the same effect as
earlier increases, when it is likely to be the case that the
earlier increases will be more powerful than the final
ones because the government is likely to pursue the
most pressing projects first. Still, it is clear that even a
modest political incentive for preparedness spending—
enough to cause politicians to increase preparedness by
just $1 per capita—would likely increase social welfare
by billions of dollars.
Although increased preparedness efforts to reduce
damage from natural disasters would substantially increase social welfare, we do not know the optimal mix
of relief and preparedness expenditures to maximize
efficiency. Indeed, relief spending is important, and
our results do not imply that it is inefficient for the
government to assist citizens after a disaster takes place
or even that relief aid should be reduced in terms of
levels, given than some negative effects of disasters are
inevitable. The fact that voters reward politicians who
provide it is a sign of competent responsiveness. However, the fact that preparedness spending has virtually
no electoral utility is clearly suboptimal. It appears that

25 If voters were as responsive to preparedness spending as they are
to relief spending, the estimate in column (2) of Table 5 suggests that
a $1 per-capita increase in preparedness would win approximately .22
percentage points of the vote because .454 ∗ (ln(2.59) − ln(1.59)) =
.22. Chen (2008) concluded that 24.6% of FEMA relief aid in response to Florida hurricanes in 2004 was politically motivated. Applying this amount to total relief would imply that about $8.50 in percapita relief is politically motivated. Thus, if the political motivation
to provide preparedness was about one eighth as large as the political
motivation to provide relief, elected officials could be expected to
provide roughly an additional $1 per-capita in preparedness spending.
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26 Expert analyses corroborate the point that this ratio may be too
low. For instance, the work of Howard Kunreuther (2006, 2008;
Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan 2009) found that government loans
to homeowners for mitigation improvements are more cost effective
than using tax dollars to compensate postdisaster property damage.
Similarly, the American Society of Civil Engineers has estimated
that dilapidated American infrastructure, such as collapsing bridges,
leaky dams and levees, and outdated power grids, requires $1.6 trillion in investment (Sofgre 2008).
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Department of Water Resources 2005). The bond proceeds were to be used to obtain federal matching funds
for the projects, in addition to financial and technical assistance from federal agencies such as the Army
Corps of Engineers.
Despite repeated warnings about the risk of severe
flooding in the Central Valley, large-scale action was
implemented only after Hurricane Katrina made the
danger salient. The importance of Hurricane Katrina
in ensuring support for Proposition 1E is suggested
by the short argument that supporters of the measure
included on the ballot. The argument read, “Our nation learned a tragic lesson from Hurricane Katrina—
we cannot continue to neglect our unsafe levees and
flood control systems” (California Attorney General
2006). The measure passed easily, winning 64% of the
vote, including 67% of the vote in Los Angeles County
and 56% of the vote in relatively conservative Orange
County, despite the fact that neither would be affected
directly by the bulk of the proposed spending. For
voters in these areas, it appears to be the case that
levee repair became a public good that voters were
willing to support after Hurricane Katrina made clear
the potential costs of inaction.27
A similar phenomenon appears to have occurred
at the federal level. Following Hurricane Katrina,
Congress passed and President Bush signed the PostKatrina Emergency Reform Act of 2006, which reorganized FEMA and appropriated $3.6 billion for
levees and other flood control measures.28 In the immediate aftermath of Katrina, voters in New Orleans
also appear to have placed greater value on these
preparedness projects. In late 2006, 30% of New Orleans residents said that “repairing the levees, pumps,
and floodwalls” should be one of the top two priorities in the rebuilding efforts, ranking this item and
crime control as their top two concerns (Kaiser Family
Foundation 2007, 55). The increased voter concern for
disaster protection appears to have faded significantly
since then. By mid-2008, only 2% of New Orleans
voters ranked “hurricane protection/rebuilding floodwalls, levees” as the top rebuilding concern (Kaiser
Family Foundation 2008, 52). This apparent change in
priorities for New Orleans residents suggests that even
an event like Hurricane Katrina is likely to increase the
salience of preparedness issues only temporarily.
Interestingly, the case of Hurricane Katrina may be
anomalous with respect to the electoral benefits of re27 However, the coefficient estimates in Table 4 indicate that disaster
damages do not significantly predict future preparedness spending,
suggesting that only highly salient disasters such as Hurricane Katrina can shift public opinion and public policy in this direction.
28 Some earlier events appear to have also generated initial bursts
in government activity, and the impetus to pursue preparedness in
those cases faded over time. In 1965, Hurricane Betsy in New Orleans led to an expanded federal effort to improve the levees and
other flood protection measures there. The completion date for the
project was eventually pushed back from 1978 to 1991, and finally to
2008, meaning that work was not completed by the time Katrina hit
(Burdeau 2008). In addition, Hurricane Andrew in 1992 inspired a
reorganization of FEMA by President Clinton and Director James
Lee Witt, but preparedness efforts lapsed due to the absence of major
storms prior to Hurricane Katrina (Carafano and Mayer 2007).
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lief spending. The federal government delivered more
than $94.8 billion in relief payments to the Gulf Coast
following Katrina (Congressional Budget Office 2007),
and the Republican Party suffered heavy losses in the
2006 and 2008 elections. Unlike most disaster events,
Hurricane Katrina was highly unique in the substantial
amount of media coverage it received. In an Associated Press poll of U.S. news editors and in the Pew
Research Center U.S. News Interest Index, Hurricane
Katrina was the top world story of 2005 (Kohut, Allen,
and Keeter 2005), and most of this coverage focused
on the mishandled immediate logistical response to the
disaster as opposed to the generous financial response
that came later. Hence, voters may have been substantially affected by the early negative media coverage
and carried those initially formed attitudes about the
administration’s competence with them into the voting
booth. Nevertheless, the case of Katrina offers two potential extensions to this research. Subsequent studies
can explore how the salience of a disaster changes the
political effectiveness of relief spending, in addition to
more closely examining how logistical response differs
from financial response.
Due to the transience of the effect that disasters have
on the visibility of preparedness, it is important to note
that there is some suggestive evidence that governments may be able to take action to make preparedness
salient to voters in a more permanent fashion. In the
late 1990s, FEMA introduced Project Impact, a grassroots disaster preparedness initiative that emphasized collaboration between government, businesses,
and local community leaders, bypassing state governments (Birkland and Waterman 2008; Wachtendorf and
Tierney 2001; Witt 1998). Under Project Impact,
FEMA selected a group of 57 communities from all
50 states (as well as Puerto Rico and the District of
Columbia) to receive either $500,000 or $1-million
grants to pursue disaster preparedness and mitigation
initiatives (Government Accounting Office 2002). The
program targeted areas of varying size and disaster risk.
Interviews with participants in the program indicate
that people valued the program. It was also credited
with helping limit damage from the February 2001
Nisqually earthquake in the Puget Sound, ironically
on the very day that the program was cancelled by the
Bush Administration (Holdeman 2005). Compared to
other counties, the change in the Democrats’ vote share
from 1996 to 2000 was 1.9% higher in Project Impact
counties, a significant difference (p = .006) (Healy and
Malhotra 2009). This estimate is only suggestive of the
possibility that voters may have responded to Project
Impact because it is not possible to control for the omitted variables that could be driving this difference.29
Future scholarship could use surveys, as well as lab and
field experiments, to determine the extent to which
voter decisions can be influenced by government efforts at increasing the salience of issues and policies in
areas such as disaster preparedness.
29 Our contacts at FEMA stated that they believed Project Impact
to be a successful program that substantially boosted morale within
the agency.
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Although our results indicate that the incumbent
presidential party has not been rewarded for investing
in disaster preparedness, it is possible that voters could
credit members of Congress for those initiatives. A
natural extension to this analysis is to explore whether
similar effects are observed in House and Senate elections. We conducted a preliminary exploration of this
question by estimating analogous models predicting
the vote share for the incumbent Senate party in the
county as the dependent variable. For a variety of potential reasons, we did not obtain precise coefficient estimates from which to draw firm conclusions.30 Across
all specifications that we considered, though, preparedness spending entered with a near-zero coefficient. We
anticipate that future research more closely examining Congressional elections will find that members of
Congress, like presidents, are not rewarded for preparedness spending.
Subsequent research could also apply our empirical
strategy of simultaneously examining voting decisions,
government policy, and associated outcomes to issues
such as education or health care, as well as explore
potential ingredients for improved retrospection. A
more complete understanding of how citizens value
preparedness and relief across a variety of domains
could both advance our theoretical understanding of
retrospective voting and help inform policy making.
Through an analysis of voter responses to disaster relief
and preparedness spending, we have addressed outstanding questions in the long-standing and extensive
literature on citizen competence in democratic societies. Examining actual decisions by the electorate, we
found heterogeneity with respect to the public’s responsiveness to various government policies. However,
we have also shown that the mere presence of responsiveness does not necessarily indicate citizen competence and that failures in accountability can lead to
substantial welfare losses.

APPENDIX: DATA SOURCES
Elections Data: For 1984 and 1988, the county-level voting
data come from General Election Data for the United States,
1950–1990, a database held at the ICPSR. For 1992–2004, the
voting data are from Congressional Quarterly’s Voting and
Elections Collection.
Natural Disaster Data: The data on natural disaster events
and damages for 1984–2004 come from the Spatial Hazard
Events and Losses Database for the United States, a database
hosted by the University of South Carolina. The data can be
accessed at www.sheldus.org.
Government Spending Data: The government spending
data come from the Consolidated Federal Funds Report.
For 1993–2004, the data come from the U.S. Census Bu-

30 Potential reasons include the volatility in Senate elections, and the
fact that in states where the partisanship of the incumbent senator
and the president are not the same, the effect of spending on Senate
vote share may be cancelled out by two competing forces—voter
responsiveness to the incumbent senator’s efforts on behalf of himor herself, and the presidential administration’s efforts on behalf of
the challenger.
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reau’s online database: www.census.gov/govs/www/cffr.html.
For 1985–1992, the data are held at the ICPSR. The spending categories are identified using the five-digit code names
provided by the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance
(www.cfda.gov). The data on per-capita federal government
spending come from Historical, Demographic, Economic,
and Social Data: The United States, 1790–2000, a database
held at the ICPSR. The Federal Assistance Award Data System is used to identify expenditures that consist of direct
payments. For 1996–2004, the Census Bureau’s website has
the data. For 1984–1995, we obtained data from Bickers and
Stein’s database (www.policydata.net).
County Income Data: The county-level income data
come from the Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates
constructed by the Census Bureau, primarily from the
Current Population Survey. The data can be accessed at
www.census.gov/hhes/www/saipe/index.html.
County Demographic Data: The data on the demographic
composition of counties come from the Census Bureau’s Historical Population Estimates series. The data can be accessed
at www.census.gov/popest/archives/.
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